APPLYING CLASSICAL FOREST REGULATION METHODS TO SMALLHOLDINGS WITH COOPERATIVE CONSTRAINTS

Abstract

This study aims to assess the cooperative regulation process of forestry producers in comparison to the traditional individual regulation of properties. Twenty (20) forest properties are studied as examples of the development of three forest regulation scenarios: 1) individual regulation, 2) group regulation, and 3) cooperative regulation. The Net Present Value (NPV) of each of the scenarios is optimized according to mathematical programming models and compared to a baseline scenario without forest regulation. According to the proposed cooperative regulation, properties had a proportion factor for annual net revenue distribution calculated from results of the baseline scenario. By comparing the NPV maximization results from scenarios 1 and 3 with the non-regulation scenario, the cost for individual regulation is on average 25%, while being only 11% for cooperative regulation, that is, a 14% reduction in property regulation costs. Additionally, cooperative regulation had the advantage of dividing properties into fewer areas when compared to individual regulation.